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The Public Choice of Elder Abuse Law
Margaret F. Brinig, Gerald Jogerst, Jeanette Daly, Gretchen Schmuch,
and Jeffrey Dawson

ABSTRACT
This interdisciplinary study finds that the way laws are written and treated by state regulators
measurably affects bureaucratic performance: the care taken by legislatures and state agencies
in developing domestic elder abuse law affects how lower-level bureaucrats investigate and
reporte abuse. Perhaps more interesting, however, are two robust findings about state law
making. Both legislator characteristics (here, being middle-aged or slightly older) and Lobbying
by seemingly the most important interest group (here, the American Association of Retired
Persons [AARP]) sometimes have an unexpected effect. We surmise that these legislators and
lobbyists find other issues both more politically attractive and more pressing since elder abuse
is almost exclusively confined to the very old and helpless. However, the presence of state
AARP lobbyists does predict more concern for the elderly at the administrative level. The
difference between legislative and regulatory lobbying may thus reflect the differing public
scrutiny given to the two.

1. INTRODUCTION

The population of elderly at risk for abuse by caretakers is large and
continues to increase. At the same time, state governments, faced with
MARGARET F. BRINIG is William G. Hammond Professor, College of Law; GERALD JOGERST, M.D., is Associate Professor, Department of Family Medicine; JEANETTE DALY,
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SCHMUCH is Social Worker, Department of Family Medicine; and JEFFREY DAWSON, ScD.,
is Associate Professor, Department of Biostatistics; all at the University of Iowa. The data,
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shrinking budgets, need guidance about how to allocate the resources
they have. From an academic perspective, theories developed by students
of government need empirical testing.
This study by an interdisciplinary team at the University of Iowa
finds that law-the way laws are written and treated by state regulators-does have a measurable effect on bureaucratic performance. That
is, the care taken by legislatures and state agencies affects how lowerlevel bureaucrats do their jobs. Perhaps more interesting, however, are
two robust findings about state law-making behavior. Both legislator
characteristics (in this case, being middle-aged or slightly older) and
lobbying by what would seem the most important interest group (in this
case, the American Association of Retired Persons [AARP]) sometimes
do not have the effect we might expect. At first blush, it would seem
logical for these variables to predict greater concern for elders at risk
of abuse. In fact, they have the opposite effect in some of the models
regardless of the way particular equations are specified, exactly how the
variables are specified, and whether or not they are interacted. We surmise that for these legislators and lobbyists there are issues that seem
more pressing because elder abuse is almost exclusively confined to the
very old (over age 85) and helpless.' (On the other hand, the presence
of AARP lobbyists in state capitals consistently does predict more concern for the elderly at the administrative, rather than the legislative,
level.)
The elderly currently live long enough to use up most of the resources
they have saved, and perhaps more, leaving debts to nursing facilities
and hospitals.2 We have accomplished enough in medical technology to
sustain the physical body past the point where mental activity has
1. This is not idle speculation. The American Association of Retired Persons (AARP)
Issues and Legislation Web page (http://www.aarp.org/issues.htm, accessed August 8, 2003)
contains 17 entries plus a number of links to more general cites. None of these 17 relates
to elder abuse. The issues mentioned include Medicare prescriptions, pension rules and

plans, local phone services, the "no call" list, Medicaid, identity theft, and use of the
tobacco tax to fund health and long-term care. The AARP does have a statement that elder
abuse ought to be prevented in chapter 13 ("Personal and Legal Rights") of The Policy
Book: AARP Public Policies 2004 (http://www.aarp.org/legislative/legipoly.html, pp. 13-3

to 13-5), which says that states should enact criminal laws and that public awareness of
abuse should be increased.
2. Life expectancy increased from 54.1 years in 1920 to 75.4 in 1990 (U.S. Census
Bureau 1992, p. 76, table 104). These changes have come in part through eradication of
some diseases and advances in surgical technology (U.S. Census Bureau 1993, pp. 23-30).
For figures on the wealth, or lack of it, possessed by elderly Americans, see Holden and
Smeeding (1990, p. 191 and table 10) and Cisneros (1989, p. 789, n.19).
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reached a point of diminishing returns, in fact, to a point where the old
person may actively dislike his or her existence.3 At the same time, the
independence fostered by Social Security has had social costs. Because
they expected to be independent, adult Americans have not perhaps been
as attentive to fostering ties with their growing children (Cox and Stark
1994; Brinig 1994) as they might have been some years ago.'
Thus, to the extent that we have chosen public or self-support of the
elderly over the historical family protection, we have closed off a vital
link in the intergenerational structure of society. Gary Becker makes this
argument in his 1993 Nobel address' when he says, "[P]arents who do
not need support when they become old do not try as hard to make
children more loyal or guiltier or otherwise feel as well-disposed toward
their parents. This means that programs like social security that significantly help the elderly would encourage family members to drift apart
emotionally, not by accident but as maximizing responses to those policies" (Becker 1993, p. 401).
In order to ensure the elderly person at least the minimum necessities
of life, 19 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico have statutes
requiring adult children to support their indigent and needy parents (see
Table 1). Unless other children in the family complain or the parents do
not have adequate Social Security or other pensions, these statutes remain hidden and rarely used. (Casual observation reveals that most
people, including graduating law students, are not aware that they exist.)
In the 20-year period from 1980 to 2000, states have shown a spate
of interest in more dramatic, physical kinds of abuse as the population
ages (especially the population over age 85; see Table 2).6 Although the
3. Posner (1995, pp. 200-222 and figure 5.1) reports that approximately 10 percent
of the population in any given age bracket says that they are not too happy. The portion
of octogenarians stating that they are very happy is about the same as for people between
30 and 39, about 30 percent. However, I have heard my own parents' friends talk of "doing

a Kevorkian," and many have joined the Hemlock Society. Use of Kevorkian's suicide
machine was permanently enjoined in People v. Kevorkian, 534 N.W.2d 172 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1995).

4. Think of the Harry Chapin tune "The Cat's inthe Cradle." Bernheim, Shleifer, and
Summers (1985, p. 1074) argue that the general decline in attentiveness of adult children
to parents ties to the introduction of Social Security.
5. See also Bernheim, Shleifer, and Summers (1985) and Brinig (1994) on how a change
in provision for elderly parents affects both positive and negative investments in minor
children.
6. The percentage over 85 was .2 percent in 1920 and 1.2 percent in 1990, according
to Vobejda (1992). By the 2000 census, the percentage of over-85 citizens increased to 1.5
percent (Hetzel and Smith 2002, p. 2 and table 1). The decline in the over-65 population
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Table 1. State Statutes That Require Support of Elderly Parents

State
Arkansas
California
District of Columbia
Indiana
Iowa
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Montana

Subject

Arkansas Statutes Annotated,
secs. 675, 675, 473
California Family Code, sec. 4400
D.C. Code, secs. 675, 473
Indiana Code, secs. 675, 675,
675, 473
Iowa Code, sec. 252.2
Kentucky Revised Statutes, sec.
430.050
Louisiana Civil Code, sec. 229

Mental health
services
General
General
Necessaries if
parent provided
General
General

1947

Necessities
(reciprocal)
Rental payments

1804

Necessaries

1957

Necessaries unless
excused by
parental
malfeasance
Hospitalization
on public
assistance
General
General

1915

General

1937

General

1986

General

1917

Necessaries

1939

General

1991

General
General
General
General

1898
1973
1952
1936

Maine Revised Statutes, title 22,
sec. 4319
Maryland Code Annotated,
Family Law secs. 675, 473
Montana Code Annotated, secs.
675, 675, 473

Nevada
New Jersey

Nevada Code, sec. 428.070
New Jersey Statutes Annotated,
sec. 44:1-140

Ohio
Oregon

Ohio Revised Code, sec. 2912.21
Oregon Revised Code, sec.
109.010
Pennsylvania Consolidated
Statutes Annotated, title 62,
sec. 1973(a)
Puerto Rico Laws, title 8, sec.
503
Rhode Island Annotated Laws,
secs. 675, 675, 473
South Dakota Codified Laws,
secs. 675, 473
Texas Health and Safety Code,
sec. 286.082(c)(2)(a)
Utah Code, secs. 675, 675, 473
Vermont Code, title 15, sec. 202
Virginia Code, secs. 20-88
West Virginia Code, secs. 675,
675, 473

Pennsylvania

Puerto Rico
Rhode Island
South Dakota
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
West Virginia

Date of
Enactment

Statute

1872
1965
1947
1851
1974

1954

1851
1924

study here involves domestic adult abuse only, we suspect that the necessarily impersonal care of the institution will produce still more abuse
in the nursing home setting.
Surveys of adult protective service investigators point to what is already a shockingly high level of elder abuse in the United States. Investigators for 47 states reported 242,430 investigations of domestic elder
from 12.6 to 12.4 during the last decade was due to the 65-74 group, who were born
during the relatively low birth rate 1920s and 1930s (Vobejda 1992).
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Table 2. Population 65 Years and Over by Age Group: 1990 and 2000

1990
Age
65+
65-74
65-69
70-74
75-84
75-79
80-84
85-94
85-89
90-94
95+

2000

Percent Total
Population

Percent

Number

Percent

Number

Percent

1990

2000

Change

31,241,831
18,206,558
10,111,735
7,994,823
10,055,108
6,121,368
3,933,739
2,829,728
2,060,247
769,481
250,437

100
58
32.4
25.6
32.2
19.6
12.6
9.1
6.6
2.5
.8

34,991,753
18,390,986
9,533,545
8,857,441
12,361,180
7,415,813
4,945,367
3,902,349
2,789,818
1,112,531
337,238

100
52.6
27.2
25.3
35.3
21.2
14.1
11.2
8
3.2
1

12.6
7.3
4.1
3.2
4
2.5
1.6
1.1
.8
.3
.1

12.4
6.5
3.4
3.1
2.6
2.6
1.8
1.4
1
.4
.1

12
1.6
-5.7
10.8
21.1
21.1
25.7
37.9
35.4
44.6
34.7

abuse for 1999, that is, 5.9 investigations per 1,000 elders. 7 The 38
states for which investigators responded reported 102,879 substantiations of abuse, amounting to 2.51 substantiations per 1,000 elders. The
geriatric population rate is continuing to grow rapidly, and the projected
number of persons 65 and older will be 18 percent of the population in
2020, compared with 13 percent in 1990 (Kapp 1995). The absolute
number of incidents will predictably rise, given current population
trends.
An American Academy of Family Physicians position statement
(1999) on elder abuse poignantly says, "[R]ecognizing that increased
age frequently leads to increased dependence in an atmosphere of constricting health care financing; a decrease in the availability of suitable,
affordable accommodations; and reduced social interactions, it follows
that the risk of geriabuse and neglect may well increase." Thus not only
the absolute numbers of elders but also the frequency of abuse may
grow.

2. UNIVERSITY OF IOWA ELDER ABUSE STUDY IN THE CONTEXT OF PUBLIC
CHOICE

The current paper details the types of and motivations for state elder
abuse law, including interpretive regulations and legislation. Further, we
7. As a point for comparison, during the same year there were 11.8 reported victims
of child abuse, on which, according to the elder abuse legislation introduced in 2002 by
Senator John Breaux, $6.5 billion was spent last fiscal year. When institutional abuse is
added to domestic elder abuse, the numbers are probably greater than for child abuse,
especially since we are here comparing reported abuse to investigated elder abuse, a much
smaller subset. There are currently 46 million persons over age 60 in this country.
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examine the actions taken by state social welfare workers who are
charged with investigating and substantiating whether elder abuse occurs. What we do not do here is discuss how much abuse occurs or how
it might be prevented.8 We cannot overemphasize the importance of such
a study, but we note that it was beyond the scope of the one reported
here.
Our interdisciplinary team at the University of Iowa studied reported
elder abuse under an unrestricted grant from the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention9 to evaluate the impact of state adult protective
service legislation and regulation on the rates of investigated and substantiated domestic elder abuse. We recognize that elder abuse is a prevalent and serious health issue. The best national estimate is that approximately 550,000 elderly persons experience domestic abuse compared with an estimated 400,000 new events of congestive heart failure
occurring in the United States annually (U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services 1994). We designed a survey to collect all domestic
elder abuse reports, investigations, and substantiations for each state
and the District of Columbia for fiscal year 1999. We independently
obtained and qualitatively reviewed each state's statutes and regulations
that pertain to adult protective services.
Three sets of public decision makers might influence elder abuse legislation and its implementation: legislators, state welfare officials, and
adult protective service investigators. Various factors motivate each set's
behavior, and discussion of the results of the study will refer to these
varying groups of influences.
According to public choice scholars, legislators have at least three
categories of influence on their behavior (Mueller 1989, pp. 229-44;
Mashaw 1997, pp. 23-25; McChesney 1987, p. 170)."° First, they must
confront their voting public (Rachlinski and Farina 2002, pp. 568-69).
Are they acting within their constituents' expressed preferences and their
own campaign promises so that they will be most likely reelected? Second, not surprisingly, they act according to their own true preferences.
8. Studies that attempt to discover the prevalence of and contributors to abuse include

Pillemer and Finkelhor (1988) and Jogerst et al. (2000).
9. See the acknowledgment note for details.
10. McChesney (1997, p. 170) writes, "The one unambiguous solution for reducing
rent extraction is reducing the size of the state itself and its power to threaten, expropriate,

and transfer." See also Mueller (1989, p. 245): "[T]he best and simplest way to avoid the
rent-seeking problem is to avoid establishing the institutions that create rents, that is, the
regulations and regulatory agencies that lead to rent seeking." See also Farber (1992, p.

59), Revesz (1997, pp. 542-43), and Schuck (1997, pp. 565-66).
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This influence may be as simple as voting according to party line or may
be deeply influenced by family situation and personal ethics (Farber and
Frickey 1991, pp. 24-25, 28-33; Macey 1986, pp. 225-27; Sunstein
1984, p. 1690-91).1" Third, they must pay at least some attention to
special interest groups whose support they will need to fund election
campaigns in the future and to guarantee the perquisites of office (Farber
and Frickey 1991, pp. 21-33; Schuck 1997; Peltzman 1984, pp.
192-206; Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen 1981).12
The second level of public official concerned with elder abuse law
and its implementation involves the social welfare bureaucrat. These
state-level officials may enact regulations that further specify types of
abuse or other factors that govern investigations and will almost certainly control the funding allocations at the state level. 3 Sometimes the
state social welfare system may allocate personnel for elder abuse investigation, or it may decide whether the same personnel investigate child
and elder abuse. Public officials, although seldom elected, face constraints as well. 4 They may be concerned with their reputation among
the people they will encounter when they leave public service (the revolving door syndrome; see Levmore 1998, p. 2101; Becker 1983, pp.
371-73; Landes and Posner 1975, p. 877; Macey 1986, pp. 231-32;
Stigler 1971, pp. 11-12; Tollison 1988)." They may also attempt to
11. Rachlinski and Farina argued (2002, pp. 553-54) that fallibility, rather than bad
motivations, causes most regulatory mistakes.
12. The classical concern about this is found in The FederalistNo. 10 (James Madison).
13. The one qualification would be line-item budgeting. There have been marked differences in the speed with which elder abuse legislation has become law in the various
states. Colorado (1990) and Idaho (1991) enacted their statutes recently, while others
(Florida, South Carolina, and Virginia) had theirs in place many years earlier (1974). We
will consider funding allocation from the federal block grants to states later in this paper.
14. Public choice theory explains statutes and regulations as the result of competing
interest groups influencing the rule-making process. See Farber and Frickey (1991, 1987).
Stewart (1975, pp. 1684-87) provides a summary of the discussion of agency "capture"
by special interests. The original article was by George Stigler (1971) and concerned regulation of the fur trade.
15. For a discussion of the importance of networks and revolving doors in executive
agencies, see Coglianese (1997, p. 1330). Sometimes they will of course be doing so for
good reasons-their own preferences follow those of the groups (Mikva 1988). For examples involving regulation of the legal profession, see New York Law Journal (1992, p.
1) and Office of Thrift Supervision (1992). Harris Weinstein was an associate at Covington
and Burling from 1962 to 1967, and from 1967 to 1969 he served as an assistant to the
solicitor general of the United States. In 1969, he returned to Covington and Burling, was
made a partner in 1971, and remained there until 1990 when he became chief counsel at
the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) (1992). In 1992, Weinstein returned to Covington
and Burling (New York Law Journal 1992, p. 1). For a discussion of enforcement pro-
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maximize their budgets (Aranson 1981; Blais and Dion 1991; Niskanen
1971, p. 197; Stigler 1975, p. 178; Buchanan, Tollison, and Tullock
1980; Aranson, Gellhorn, and Robinson 1982, pp. 37-62; Johnson and
Vass 1983; Peltzman 1984) or the power of their agency in the state
cabinet.16
Finally, local protective services investigators will implement domestic
abuse law. They too will be motivated by their own preferences and
constrained by their caseloads and job descriptions. Many of them have
chosen a career in public welfare out of a sense of vocation 17 since it
requires substantial education and does not pay particularly well. (Recently, it may also subject the worker to the threat of lawsuits, if not
financial liability, if mistakes are made.)"8 One of the continual conflicts
we see in this study is that some investigators do both child and elder
abuse investigations. 1" If they were hired to investigate only child abuse,
they may resent the new assignment (and it may be added to the existing
caseload) or they may just feel it detracts from a "true mission." 20 Some
of these investigators will not even have been trained adequately for the

ceedings brought by Weinstein on behalf of the OTS against lawyers and other professionals, see Paltrow (1994, p. D1), which discusses private-sector jobs landed by several
top government enforcement officials, including former Securities Exchange Commission
chairman David Ruder at Baker and McKenzie. See generally Painter (1996, pp. 169-70).
For a discussion of agenda control among agency interest groups, see Zywicki (1999, pp.
885-86).
16. Thus, they may seek to increase the number of people working under them, the
number of cases served, the number of reports issued, and so forth (see Rachlinski and
Farina [2002, p. 568] for sources).
17. Rightfully so. As Lynn Stout (2001, p. 19) puts it, "Homo economicus is a sociopath." She continues, "People can be motivated to adopt other-regarding norms; to follow
norms even when they have no external incentives to do so; and to enforce norms against
others even when this is personally costly. But they can only be motivated to do these
things when the social conditions are favorable."
18. Although they may make some mistakes (Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein 1982,
pp. 475-78; Camerer, Loewenstein, and Weber 1989), because they are able to remain
detached from the emotions of particular cases and see across a broad spectrum of them,
they are less likely to make cognitive mistakes than more direct participants (Rachlinski
and Farina 2002, p. 559).
19. The tendency to see things only in terms of one's own expertise is discussed by
Rachlinski and Farina (2002, p. 560, citing Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein [1982, p.
477]). The average amount of training received by adult protective services investigators
is 1 week, while the range was from less than 1 hour to more than 3 weeks.
20. Holden (2000, p. 1) warned his colleagues of "the follyof recruiting and helping
to educate human beings and at the same time pummeling them into conscious disdain for
what they do."
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distinctive signs and problems of elder abuse cases.2 1 Some of the agencies are currently overwhelmed with the size of their caseload even before
elder abuse is added to it.22 We turn now to our models, after which we
will discuss how we obtained each variable. Finally, we will present and
discuss results.

3. TWO SIMPLE MODELS

The law making we can analyze using state-level data involves decisions
made by the legislature in the first instance and those made by statelevel bureaucrats, who enact and implement regulations, in the second.
We therefore present two models, one for each of these types of public
decision making. We can assess the effects of each type on the lowerlevel bureaucrats by looking at the actual numbers of elder abuse interventions (investigations, substantiations, and the ratio of these) in the
second of a system of equations.
3.1. ModeL 1: Law from Legistation
As a first step, legislators enact elder protection laws, responding to the
federal mandate but also to the concerns of their own constituents and
interest groups. We posit a model that seeks to explain differences in
these laws among the U.S. states. In general, this model specifies that
the length of the statute (W, or Word Count) is influenced by the demographic makeup of the legislature itself (0, or Older Legislators), the
ease with which legislation passes (that is, the lack of many amendments
by the other legislative chamber) (SPD, or Same Party Dominant), and
the role played by the relevant interest group, the AARP (A, or AARP
Lobbyists/Legislator).
The word count (W) is a relevant indicator of differences between
states that will show up in the second equation because the statute length
influences the social workers who are charged with investigating dependent abuse. As discussed above, they may view a detailed set of laws as
showing interest on the part of the legislature (or a mandate to do
21. For a discussion that suggests that the judiciary and public oversight may remedy
these problems, see Rachlinski and Farina (2002, pp. 588-89).
22. For example, the city of New York child welfare system was (see Marisol A. v.
Guiliani, 929 E Supp. 662 [S.D.N.Y. 1996], aff'd, 126 F.3d 372 12d Cir. 1997]) and the
District of Columbia now is (see LaSbawn A. v. Barry, 144 F.3d 847 [D.C. Cir. 1998]) in
receivership after massive lawsuits that noted proliferating unconstitutional conditions.

Even in Iowa, there are many complaints about the caseload (Okamoto 2003, p. B1).
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thorough investigations), and they may also feel that they have more or
less guidance for what they are supposed to do. Thus, equation (2) will
also feature W. However, it would be naive to suggest that legislative
influences are the only motivators for those workers. The social workers
who substantiate reports of abuse (S, or Substantiation Rate) will take
these factors into account, but they also should be substantiating on the
basis of how much abuse exists in their area. Although we must emphasize that we do not know how much abuse there actually is, studies
do show some of the predictors of increased abuse. These include the
proportion of elders who do not live alone (EW, or Elders Not Living
Independently), population density (PD, or Population Density), and
income (I, or Median Family Income):23
W = [(O, SPD, A)

(1)

S = f(W, PD, I, EW).

(2)

and

We hypothesized that as the number of older legislators relative to
the total number in the legislature increased, so would the length of the
statutes.24 We also surmised that having both chambers controlled by
the same political party should result in shorter statutes and that an
increased number of AARP lobbyists per legislator should increase statute length. 21 In equation (2), we predicted that statute length would
23. In equation (2), instrumental variables include the rate of people over age 65 living
with others, population density, median family income, and the variables that are used to
predict word count: Population Elderly, Same Party Dominant, AARP Lobbyists/Legislator,
and the proportion of the population living alone.
24. We ran the same set of equations using the number of legislators over age 55 as
the proportion of the smallest chamber (invariably, the state senate).
25. In the analysis section, we will show that it did not. In fact, regardless of how we
ran the equations (AARP lobbyist total, ratio of AARP lobbyists to the number of senators,
ratio of AARP lobbyists to the size of the whole legislature), the coefficients were negative
and insignificant. The same counterintuitive results appear for older legislators, although
this time the coefficients were significant. Whether it was the ratio of over-55 legislators
to the entire legislature, older legislators total, or the ratio of over-55 legislators in the
senate to the size of senate, the coefficients were negative (and significant at the .05 level).
At the our referee's suggestion, we also reran all the above equations with legislators over
age 60. We had the same negative and significant coefficient, although a lower R value
(and an insignificant result in the two-stage least squares equation of Table 5). We also
tried including an interaction term between various specifications of 0 and AARP, but this
was not significant and did not change the signs or significance of the various 0 and AARP
variables. As with all regressions, we will be happy to supply data, syntax, and output on
request.
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positively affect substantiations and that as abuse increased, so would
the investigations of it. That is, as the number of people over 65 increased
and alcoholism increased, so should abuse.2 6 Increased education and
income should have decreased abuse. More abuse occurs in rural areas,
where the elder is less visible and alternatives (like elder respite care)
are not as available. In addition, the social worker would have to travel
a greater distance to cover her caseload. We therefore guessed that population density would be negatively related to investigations.
3.2. Law from Regutation
Sometimes when regulators make law, they do so in a way very similar
to that of elected legislators. An example of this kind of legislating can
be found in Table 6, which predicts the number of definitions of abuse
included in regulations. Sometimes, however, they act more directly
through allocating positions, such as deciding that the same investigator
will investigate child and elder abuse (Table 8). Sometimes they will do
so through policies like the one modeled here for the way records are
kept (Table 10). In some states, every report of abuse must be investigated and followed through the system. In others, only some reports are
recorded and investigated; those felt not to be serious or referred to
some other agency are not "counted" for official records. We were very
interested in this difference in accountability and hypothesized that states
with more careful control over records would have a higher ratio of
substantiations to investigation (or efficiency).
The first step in this second model was to see whether the state
bureaucrats chose the "must keep track of all reports" system or not
(KT, or Keep Track).27 This choice might be affected directly by the
number of lobbyists (A, or AARP Lobbyists per Legislator, and B, or
Nursing Home Beds per Capita) as well as the size of the elderly population relative to the population in general (E, or Population Elderly)
and relative to the amount given to fund adult protective services (F).
In equation (4), this calculated probability (KT) will affect the per26. Because there are only a maximum of 47 observations (and not all states reported
both investigations and substantiations), any system of equations must not use too many

variables. We therefore included Population over 65, Population Density, and Median
Family Income in Table 5. Alcoholism, the rate of health care providers, and the high school
graduation rate all performed with the expected sign, but none of these was statistically
significant.

27. Other equations reported in the tables are not described in notation but follow
similar conventions.
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formance of those doing the investigating (adult protective services [APS]
workers) along with the relative strength of the old/young population
ratio (RA), the resources available from social security for the adult
protective services (SB, or Social Security Block Grant [SSBG]), and the
amount of child abuse that must be investigated and substantiated (CA,
or Child Abuse):
KT = f(A, B, E, F)

(3)

RT = f(KT, RA, SB, CA).

(4)

and

We predicted that state agencies would be more likely to keep track
of all reported abuse in states where there were relatively more elderly
(although this might also indicate more abuse and therefore less attention
could be paid to each report) and where they were successfully lobbied
by interest groups for the elderly and for nursing homes. They would
also be more likely to choose this method in states with relatively higher
amounts given to fund APS.
We hypothesized that states that chose to monitor reported abuse
more closely would have a higher rate of substantiations. This rate also
should be influenced by the relative willingness of the state to fund APS.
More abuse might be expected with a higher child abuse rate (since other
studies have found these to be highly correlated); although income and
abuse itself are inversely related, the sign on income is ambiguous since
higher-income people are also more likely to report abuse.

4.

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

4.1. Dependent Variables
Our interdisciplinary team originally hypothesized that differences in the
law would have little or no effect on the investigation or substantiation
of domestic elder abuse, at least on the statewide reporting level. We
tested this hypothesis in a number of ways. The first was the rate of
investigations per population over age 60. This could be an indicator
of the real amount of abuse in a state or the sensitivity of the reporting
population to the issue of elder abuse. The second was the raw number
of substantiations of these investigations per affected population. Third,
we considered the ratio of the two, which might be considered a measure
of APS efficiency.
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4.2. Legal Variables

Variables of interest, which are considered in separate equations, included several measures of the depth of legislative or administrative
interest in the issues of elder abuse. These included two simple word
counts: the number of words in the statutes governing APS and the
number of words in the definitions of abuse.2"
The state laws analyzed for this study were those that address elder
abuse in domestic settings, which are administered typically by state APS
programs or state aging agencies. Many states have additional legislation, not considered here, pertaining to elders such as the laws required
by the Older Americans Act and Long-Term Care Ombudsman Program.
State also have laws that prohibit and specify punishment for abuse in
institutions. These data are separately collected, and agencies other than
those involved here enforce the laws.
Another way of looking at the problem is to examine the proliferation
of types of abuse included in the statutes and regulations. The types
most frequently represented include abuse not otherwise specified, abandonment, emotional abuse, exploitation, neglect, physical abuse, selfneglect, and sexual abuse. Self-neglect, with its display of sensitivity to
the particular problems of dependent elders, seemed significant enough
to test as a separate measure but turned out not to be statistically significant. Ten states include self-neglect as an independent definition of
abuse, while 21 states subsume self-neglect in their neglect definition.
Similarly, states that reported the number of reports that were begun
(as opposed to simply the number of investigative files that were opened)
seemed more likely to be doing careful screening of complaints as they
were received. The last inquiry of this type involved mandatory reporting. We considered whether it made a significant difference if particular
individuals were compelled by law to report abuse and particularly if
there was a definition or specification of those required to report. We
considered the amount legislators were willing to spend for APS (per
28. Earlier work found that the longer and more complex the bill (estimated by page
count), the greater the amount of government spending required by the law (Kimenyi and
Tollison 1995, p. 155 and table 1). Similarly, the length of a state constitution, measured
by the number of words, was used as a proxy for the durability of past legislative contracts,
"since longer constitutions reflect the survival of past amendments from nullification by
past legislators and the judiciary" (Crain and Tollison 1979, p. 171). Constitution length
turned out to be significantly related to the number of amendments offered by the legislature
(Kimenyi and Tollison 1995). The number of words in the regulations turned out to be
unrelated to any of the dependent variables.
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person served) and whether the state put different workers in place to
investigate elder and child abuse allegations.
As previously noted, not all law comes from state legislatures: it
comes also from the administrators who write regulations and carry out
the legislative mandate and, although not yet in the elder law context,
from the courts. Although there might be political support for elder
protective services,29 concern on the administrative agency level might
also affect the number of investigations or their efficiency. We therefore
considered whether there were regulations at all, how many regulations
contained definitions, and whether these definitions did anything other
than mimic what the legislature had already enacted.
Definitions in regulations may actually help APS workers know what
to look for. Compared with statutes, agency-made rules may be clearer
or in language that is easier for other people in the profession to understand. The fact that additional definitions of abuse are spelled out
may also give the caseworkers confidence that people in the agency care
about elder abuse issues. It turns out that the number of definitions is
positively related to greater accuracy.
Many laws have little impact on people's day-to-day behavior. With
elder abuse law, schemes that matter have some identifiable characteristics, even in a preliminary investigation. Two critical features of domestic elder abuse legislation are, first, whether the law holds people,
including health professionals, accountable and, second, whether the
laws increase the expertise of the people charged with making judgments
about abuse.
Some states begin tracking abuse at the investigation stage. We hypothesized that results from these stages would differ from those in states
that begin tracking with an abuse report. We hypothesized that the
"reporting" states, because of their greater care at initial stages, would
have higher investigation and substantiation rates.
In situations where wrongdoing is alleged, there is often much more
success in smaller populations where the investigator knows the perpetrator (Chambers 1979, pp. 90-114; Sherman 2001, p. 264). The
accused will also be more likely to confess, making substantiations more
likely. Too large an elderly population may either overwhelm an APS
office or may increase the levels of bureaucracy to the point where little
29. Bills are relatively easy to introduce compared with the cost of securing their
passage (Brinig, Holcolmbe, and Schwartzstein 1993, p. 378).
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"front-line" (as opposed to administrative) work gets done.3" To the
extent that the elderly population (or sometimes the ratio of elders to
young people) affects both the structure of the law and the way it is
enforced, we treat it as exogenous.
Where the legislature has obviously spent a good deal of time and
effort on elder protective services (by writing a long and detailed statute),
caseworkers and their supervisors may feel that they are doing something
that is politically important as well as personally challenging and may
be more likely to carry out investigations. In a related way, the investigator whose mission is well defined may feel more authority to intervene in families by doing the investigation.
In some jurisdictions where reporting is not required, volunteers may
staff telephone hotlines. If the volunteer decides that further investigation
is not required, that is the end of the matter unless reports are kept and
tracked. Some actual abuse cases may be missed entirely, or mistakes by
the untrained volunteer who is forwarding information may change the
course of the whole investigation.
Public choice, or the study of behavior by government entities and
the people acting in them, assumes certain behavior by bureaucrats (Niskanen 1971, p. 114). In particular, the heads of agencies, regardless of
their political cast, will choose to maximize their own importance and
power. Usually they will do this by maximizing their budgets, sometimes
by employing more people or demonstrating tangible "results" (here,
perhaps, either in the bulk of the regulations they generate or in the
number of reports their agency can claim to file).
For people who work as teams, when individual performance cannot
easily be monitored, the natural tendency is to shirk (Alchian and Allen
1983; Cheung 1983, p. 3) or to show up but to work as little as possible.
Requiring that reports be tracked forces APS workers and their supervisors to be accountable. It permits each worker's level of effort (and,
hopefully, success with elders) to be monitored.
Further, the more each caseworker drafts and reviews abuse reports,
the better he or she may become at recognizing patterns of abuse that
might be missed if each case is dealt with in isolation. Written reports
also permit knowledge, over time, of repeated complaints about particular families.
30. Compare fears in Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 605-6 (1979), over physician time
devoted to hearings instead of care.
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4.3. PubLic Choice Analysis
Although some of the relationships that were discussed above may not
require further exploration, others that involve legal characteristics seem
perplexing. Why might variables such as word count or the number of
abuse definitions contained in the regulations have any meaningful relationship to the rates of investigation or substantiation of elder abuse
or the ratio between substantiations and investigations? The answer is
not intuitively obvious. However, the variables might correlate because
word count or the number of definitions actually proxied for, or were
symptomatic of, something else. This paper has already discussed one
alternative: that having .more explicit direction could prove helpful to
the APS workers dealing with dependent elderly adults. To tease out
what was going on, we collected a number of political and other variables
that might explain why particular statutes proved more verbose or particular regulations more precise. When the equations were respecified to
include political as well as socioeconomic dimensions, the relationships
became clearer and the results were interesting indeed.
Turning to a description of the political variables, for each of the
states and the District of Columbia, we collected a number of variables.
We already knew the percentage of the population that was considered
elderly according to the state definitions in the APS statutes.31 This rate
reflects the relative size of the population that the legislator considering
APS legislation necessarily takes into consideration when writing or voting on legislation.32 This rate is one of three used in this paper that
involve elderly populations. The other two are the number of elderly
living with others and the ratio of the elderly to the minor child population. The explanation of what each of these does and when we will
use it begins with the percentage of elderly in the population. The sign
for this cannot easily be predicted. The elderly who vote (probably not
those who will themselves be at risk for abuse in any given period) are
likely to prefer allocation of resources to themselves rather than to children. For example, we would predict that they would rather see social
services block grants distributed to programs for seniors rather than for
after-school care of small children. However, a larger proportion of eld31. Most of these were for adults above age 60. One state counted adults over age 55
and a few over age 65.
32. The most complete economics paper discussing the trade-offs of legislators between
interest groups and the voting public is Peltzman (1984). See generally McCormick and
Tollison (1981) and Becker (1983).
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erly in the population also means a greater number of potential candidates for abuse, a larger nonworking population, and an additional
burden for social service agencies. Thus, the ratio of the elderly population to the general population might make a difference because it
would reflect both the strain on the APS system and the political clout
of the elder population.
To get at this problem, we sometimes use the ratio of the elderly to
minor children in the state, which is more apt to reveal power differences
and the actual allocation of resources rather than an increase in the
potential amount of abuse.
Finally, there is the variable for measuring the percentage of elderly
who do not live alone. If this is used as a political variable, there is an
increase in sensitivity to the problems of the elderly (by the younger
adults with whom they live). If this is used as a predictor of actual
domestic abuse, the sign should be unambiguously positive, since we are
looking at domestic abuse in this study, and domestic abuse should
increase as the number of elders living with relatives increases.33 Our
intuitions do not lead us to predict that the efficiency with which the
APS investigators work (the ratio of substantiations to investigations)
should change with the size or relative size of the elderly population, so
Table 7 contains none of these variables.
More directly, the legislators might be influenced by the lobbyists for
the elderly, most prominent of which is the AARP. We therefore collected
data on the number of lobbyists for the AARP for each state.34 Rather
than use raw numbers for most equations, we divided this by the total
number of legislators. 5 Older legislators might have a personal interest
in legislation that will shortly protect them, so we also collected the

33. This number was computed by subtracting the percentage living alone from unity.
This does not capture those who live in institutions, who also may be subjects for abuse

but who are not studied in this paper. This number is less than 20 percent even of the very
old, however.
34. We found this by looking at each state's list of lobbyists. Most of these were
available on the Internet. A few states reported the information in private correspondence,
but one required purchase of the lobbyist list.
35. At the referee's suggestion, we also calculated the ratio of AARP lobbyists to the
population. This turned out to be a less successful predictor than the number of AARP

lobbyists per legislator, probably because the size of state government in the capital does
not increase proportionately with the population.
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number of legislators (and calculated rates) who were over age 55.36 We
used these to calculate the proportion of elder legislators for each state.
We also sought to measure the effect of a competing situation, or substitute, for the elderly living at home.37 Dependent elderly who are not
cared for by their family live either on their own (and are unlikely to
have a lobbying presence) or in nursing home facilities. It would seem
possible for those interested in nursing home care to want stronger domestic abuse laws to encourage more residents to enter their facilities.
We have already mentioned that we suspect that with its paid and im36. We began this laborious process by looking at http://www.vote-smart.org then
reviewing each legislator's home page or linked biography. These most often contained
dates of birth-we simply selected anyone with a birth date of 1945 or earlier since our
data came from 2000. In some instances, where a birth date was unavailable, we calculated
from college or high school graduation date or considered service in World War I or the
Korean War, membership in the AARP, or large numbers of grandchildren (plus candidate
pictures). We did not include information for members newly elected in 2000.
Because of the approximation that was necessary, we did not initially try to estimate
the number of those over age 60 (to reflect most of the state statutes, although some were
for people over age 55 and some for those over age 65). We chose age 55 initially because
it was the lowest cutoff for all states and also because it was just over the mean age for
state legislators. See also Pew Center on the States (2003), reporting on the basis of a
survey of 771 legislators in January-March 2002 (2 years after the year that we are concerned with) that the breakdown of ages was 18-29, 3 percent; 30-49, 32 percent; 50-64,
45 percent; and 65+, 19 percent; 1 percent refused to answer.
To give an idea of the problems we faced in making these estimates, we report on two
state senates (which always contain the majority of the older legislators). Connecticut has
36 senators. Nine of these were over age 55 in 2000. We would estimate that six were
probably over age 60. In one case only, we knew a birth date (1929). In one case we knew
the senator served in the Navy from 1957-61. Assuming he was at least 18 when he enlisted,
that would make him 61 in 2000. One had no information from which his age could be
calculated, but said he had 15 grandchildren. Another had no age information but had
nine grandchildren. One said he had lived in Stratford since 1944 but was born elsewhere.
One woman said she was a retired teacher, and one woman simply appeared from her
picture to be over age 65 but had no age-related information. Another three were probably
over age 55 but under age 60.
Similarly, in Illinois, there are 59 senators. Of these, 11 were certainly over age 60 (on
the basis of a similar mixture of dates, war service, and guesses). Another nine were certainly
between the ages of 55 and 60 on the basis of their birth dates. The final group of nine
were guesses-most were likely over 55 but of indeterminate age.
Some states reveal this information: in Wisconsin in 2001, there were nine senators
and 12 members of the assembly over age 60: the average age for the senate was 52 and
for the assembly 47, while the oldest senator was 73. In Minnesota, the senate had 23
members over age 60, with the oldest being 74 and the mean being 54. In the assembly,
there were 15 over age 60, and the median age was 48.4. Nationwide, about 64 percent
are over age 50, and 19 percent are over age 65. See Pew Center on the States (2003) and
Stateline.org(http://www.stateline.org) for a discussion of a survey conducted in early 2002
of 771 state legislators.
37. We thank our referee for this suggestion.
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personal caretakers, potentially more elder abuse occurs in nursing
homes than in domestic situations. However, institutional abuse has long
been recognized, criminalized, and prosecuted. The prohibitions occur
in different statutes (usually in departments of institutions and agencies
rather than departments of human services or aging). Resisting more
aggressive protective service statutes would thus not directly affect the
nursing institutions. The predicted sign is therefore ambiguous.
In addition, certain structural variables might influence endogenous
variables like word count. In particular, domination by different political
parties in the two legislative houses (except in Nebraska and the District
of Columbia, which are unicameral)3" or between the legislature and the
governor, who would need to approve or veto legislation, might mean
that language was added to enable compromises. We therefore collected
the political party designation of each state legislator in the year 2000
as well as that of the governor (or mayor, in the case of the District of
Columbia). We calculated the proportion of each house that was Democratic and noted whether both houses were or were not on the same
side of 50 percent. For those in which both houses were either Democratic or Republican, we also noted cases in which the governor was of
the other party (although this turned out to be insignificant in any regression). In some equations, particularly those in which funding was
involved, the legislature's tendency toward social intervention might also
be important (also using the "percent Democratic" variable). The number of years the statute had been in existence also might matter for its
verbosity, since there would be more time to amend the statute and to
redefine portions that turned out to be ambiguous. Neither of these last
two variables was significant in any equation. Table 3 shows descriptive
statistics for these variables.

5. REGRESSION ANALYSIS

5.1. Word Count
We predicted that word count in the APS statutes would be influenced
by the ratio of AARP lobbyists to legislators, the ratio of legislators over
age 55 to the total number of legislators, and difference in political party
between legislative chambers. Results are reported in Table 4.
38. These are available on each state's Web site and also can be found at http:/I

www.vote-smart.org.
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Table 4. Determinants of Word Count of Statutes

Proportion of legislators over age 55
AARP lobbyists/legislators
Same party controls both chambers
1 (Constant)
Note. AARP

=

B

Standard
Error

Significance

-10,850.179
-2,918.734
-1,555.329
11,115.157

4,501.167
5,981.132
888.474
1,889.438

.020
.628
.087
.000

American Association of Retired Persons. Adjusted R2

=

.096.

The two variables of statistical significance were the proportion of
the legislature made up of members over age 55 and whether the same
party controlled both houses. We had thought that if many legislators
were themselves concerned (because of their advancing age) about issues
facing dependent adults, the statutes would be longer, but the sign was
negative. This was contrary to our expectation. We surmise that these
elder-dominated legislatures were trying to get other benefits. Perhaps,
to the extent that they acted in self-interest, they were unconcerned about
their own potential to be abused (since they are clearly competent to
care for themselves at the time they serve).39 Younger legislators might
be more concerned with elder abuse because of the uncertainty they face
concerning their own futures (that is, they do not know whether they
will continue to be independent when they are old). They may also be
more idealistic or more aware of the elder abuse phenomenon. Perhaps
the older legislators are more beholden to the AARP's agenda (although
the interaction terms we tried were not significant). If more compromise
was necessary because different parties control each house, the statutes,
as predicted, got longer.4" A larger presence of AARP lobbyists did not
affect the total word count, but the sign was also negative, contrary to
our prediction, probably for one of the reasons given above for the
relatively more elderly legislatures. (The AARP acts primarily as an interest group for the more affluent population over age 55, especially
those who want to feel young. These people, like the people over 55
already serving on legislatures, are unlikely to be concerned about their
own abuse and may be more concerned with keeping Social Security
and Medicaid intact and reducing the cost of prescription drugs. They
39. As discussed previously, we would not expect to find any legislator currently experiencing abuse. In fact, many of the APS statutes require that the victim be "dependent,"
that is, "unable to perform one of the major functions of everyday life."

40. The dummies for same party controls were zero for no and one for yes.
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Table 5. Determinants of Substantiation Rate, Word Count Endogenous

Variable
Word count
Population density
Proportion age 60+ not
living alone
Median family income
Constant

B
.000528
.000138
.505189
4.10738838E-05
-48.376092

Standard
Error

T

.000276
.001527

.0652
.9287

.240085
2.6766E-05
22.810168

.0438
.1354
.0423

Note. Adjusted R2 = .07799; system R2 = .43181.

may feel that in strongly advocating these measures, they have already
pushed for enough "elder interest" legislation.)
When word count is included in a two-stage least squares equation
as an endogenous variable, with the substantiation rate as the dependent
variable and using a number of socioeconomic variables as instrumental
variables, the result is quite impressive (see Table 5). The system (or
2
multiple) R 2 equals .43181, while the final equation has an adjusted R
of .07799.
Consistent with our predictions, a longer statute does produce a
higher substantiation rate. The predicted word count of the statute was
significantly (at .06) related to the substantiation rate. Perhaps this is
because APS workers with more guidance from the legislature and more
confidence that their work is important do a better or more enthusiastic
job. The proportion of elderly living alone was negatively and significantly related to substantiations of abuse. Since we are talking about
domestic abuse (many times by a coresident of the victim), the positive
relationship is not surprising. Alternatively, it may simply indicate that
where the elderly remain self-sufficient, they are at lower risk for abuse.
An increase in population density, as expected, is associated with a higher
substantiation rate. This can be seen as another "reporting variable,"
since it is more difficult for the isolated elder in a rural environment to
report abuse. There was also a higher substantiation rate with increases
in median family income. Again, the positive relationship may reflect
the tendency to report or a greater confidence by APS workers that there
will be social services to provide the elder at risk.
5.2. Definitions in the Regulations
Similarly, we can look at the components of the number of definitions
in the regulations. For political variables, we are interested in things that
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Table 6. Determinants of the Number of Abuse Definitions in State Regulations

Variable
High school graduation rate
Expenditure on APS per 60+
population
Population 60+ (%)
Nursing home beds per 60+
population
AARP lobbyists/legislator
Constant

B
.128

Standard
Error

Significance

.343

.090

2.814E- 09
-23.279

.081
-. 179

.666
.331

-27.223
-17.701
-. 476

-. 196
-. 518

.330
.016
.947

Note. APS = adult protective services; AARP = American Association of Retired Persons.
Adjusted R2 = .213.

might affect the behavior within the state agencies that write the regulations. We can explain the number of definitions that are included in
the regulations (which will be our instrumental variable) as a function
of the total percentage of the population that is elderly (which correlates
significantly with total definitions at the .037 level of probability), 4' the
high school graduation rate for the state, the ratio of AARP lobbyists
to legislators (which might also indicate the interest group pressure put
on the agencies, since many lobbyists operate in both political branches
and frequently help draft regulations), and the total expenditures on APS
interventions for the state. The adjusted R2 for this equation, with Number of Definitions in Regulations as the dependent variable, is .213 (see
Table 6).
In this equation, the significant predictors are the high school graduation rate, which is positively related, and the number of AARP lobbyists per legislator, which is also positive. Convincing a bureaucracy
to expand on state legislation apparently requires both an educated electorate42 and a concerted lobbying effort.
The next step was a two-stage least squares set of equations that
predict the substantiation/investigation ratio, with the number of definitions in the regulations as an instrumental variable. This simple set of
41. Running this equation using the ratio of the over-60 to under-18 population produced an adjusted R2 of .216. However, the coefficient on the ratio itself was not significant
(.302). Using Percent Elderly in the Population and AARP Lobbyists/Legislator had an
R' of .213 and coefficient on Percent Elderly of .318.
42. Education might proxy for wealth, which when per capita median income was
substituted for it was only slightly less significant, at .084.
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Table 7. Determinants of Substantiation/Investigation Ratio, Number of
Definitions Endogenous

Variable
Total definitions in regulation
Percent of SSBG spent on APS
Population density
Constant

B
.042525
.009138
.000371
.212359

Standard
Error
.020646
.008296
.000184

Significance
.0496
.2808
.0542
.105172

Note. SSBG = Social Security Block Grant; APS = adult protective services. Adjusted
R' = .131; system R2 = .470.

equations had an R 2 of .470, with an adjusted R 2 for the second equation
(predicting the ratio) of .131 (see Table 7).
As we expected, the predicted value for total regulations had a significant and positive impact on the substantiation/investigation ratio.
The population density was positive and significant (at the .05 level),
and the percentage of SSBG spent on APS was positive, although not
significant. As we saw in the earlier discussion, the denser the population,
the more likely reporting will be followed by substantiation.
5.3. Different Investigators for Child and Elder Abuse

Even further down the administrative hierarchy sit the APS investigators.
We predicted that the tendency for the state agency to require the same
APS worker to investigate both child and elder abuse would influence
the investigator's behavior, which in turn would affect investigation and
reporting.4 3 We would predict that more rural and less wealthy states
would do this and that when the same investigator handled both types
of abuse the ratios of both investigations and substantiations would
decrease. The first step, again, was to predict which states had the different or specialized investigators for each type of abuse (Table 8)."
Here the alternative of nursing home facilities might make a difference.
One of the striking things about the social worker who confronts elder
abuse is the fact that even if abuse is found, removing the elder from

43. In our coding, zero means that the same investigator handled both types of abuse

and one means different or specialized investigators.
44. We utilized a logistic regression, since the state either does or does not have the
same investigator, with a Cox and Snell R2 of .225.
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Table 8. Logistic Regression Determining Probability of State Using Different Investigator for
Child and Adult Abuse

Variable
Nursing home beds/population 60+
Ratio of over 60 to under 18
AARP lobbyists/legislator
High school graduation rate
Child poverty rate
Constant

B

Standard
Error

Significance

-71.783
6.035
6.092
-. 196
-. 220
18.220

30.637
3.777
8.133
.101
.131
9.879

.019
.110
.454
.053
.094
.065

Note. AARP = American Association of Retired Persons. Cox and Snell R' = .225.
the home will not always improve the elder's situation.4 5 The nursing
home numbers (nursing home beds per population over age 60 in the
state) were calculated from the data that are available for each state on
the Medicare Web site." As the relative number of beds increased (and
with it the clout of the nursing home industry), the tendency to require
different (or specialized) investigators decreased, and this coefficient was
statistically significant at the .02 level. 47 The variable for AARP lobbyists
per legislator, while positive, was not significant, nor was the relative
size of the elderly and child population. Two other positive and significant variables (both at the less than .10 level) were the high school
graduation rate in the state and the child poverty rate. Presumably a
more educated population would see the value of differentiating between
child and adult abuse, while a state welfare bureaucracy overwhelmed
by a high child poverty rate would choose not to spend the money on
record keeping. More simply, poorer states will have lower graduation
rates and more pressing problems than elder abuse. They may also have
less of a progressive tradition of government social welfare activism.
Because a logistic and linear regression cannot be combined in the
same system in a straightforward way,4" we include a regression for the
45. This is in contrast to the current theories about child abuse, which mandate a
relatively rapid removal from the situation at least in cases of serious abuse. Adoption and
Safe Families Act, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115, codified as amended, 42 U.S Code
secs. 671, 675, 473A, 1320a-9. 629a (1994 and Supp. V 1995-2000). Still, many children
would rather return to the parents who abused them than live with strangers, particularly
in foster care. See, for example, Pagano (1999, p. 243).
46. See http://www.medicare.gov. These were gathered for each state by Dr. John Park
of the Department of Public Health, University of Iowa, and totaled for each state and the
District of Columbia by Brinig.
47. Again, thanks to the anonymous referee for making this suggestion.
48. The procedure we used is described in Maddala (1983, pp. 240-41).
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Table 9. Substantiation Rate: Different Investigator, Endogenous

B

Standard
Error

1.759087
.046152
-6.600161
5.452712

1.684145
.087144
2.904580
1.840735

Variable
Different investigators
for child and adult
Percent of SSBG spent on APS
Ratio of over 60 to under 18
Constant

Significance
.3052
.6006
.0309

Note. SSBG = Social Security Block Grant; APS = adult protective services. R2 = .09;
system R2 = .423.

substantiation rate with the saved predicted coefficients from the first
equation included as an independent variable in the second (see Table
9). The predicted value of having different investigators for children and
elders translates into the substantiation rate49 in the hypothesized positive way but was not statistically significant. The amount of the SSBG
spent on APS was also not significant (although again, it was positive
as expected). The one significant (at .03 level) variable was the ratio of
the elderly to the child population, and this was negative. This was what
we hypothesized, since, holding the tendency to have specialized investigators constant, a larger percentage of the elderly in the population
should heighten social services' awareness of this population at risk.
5.4. Keeping Track of Alt Reports
We would also predict that those investigators who are required to keep
track of all reports of abuse would have higher substantiation rates.
Again, the first step is to determine the equation for keeping track of
all reports. The Cox and Snell R 2 (since, again, it is a binary dependent
variable) is .348 (Table 10). Both the AARP and nursing home interest
groups showed significant and positive relationships with the tendency
to require that reports be tracked. The percent elderly in the population
was not significant, nor was the expenditure on APS per capita. Table
11 shows a two-stage least squares of substantiation rates, holding the
requirement that APS keep track of all reports endogenous."0
The predicted value of Keep Track, as predicted, was positive. How49. The two-stage least squares equation had the significant variables from the logistic
regression included: nursing home beds per 60+ population, ratio over 60 to under 18,
high school graduation rate, and child poverty rate. The system R was .423, while the R
value for the substantiation rate was .09.
50. The R' of this equation was .238.
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Table 10. Determinants of Rule That Adult Protective Services Track ALLReports

Variables
AARP lobbyists/legislator
Nursing home beds/60+ population
Percent elderly population
Rate of expenditures on APS
Constant

B

Standard
Error

Significance

.178
54.128
-36.685
.000
2.525

.084
31.161
32.404
.000
4.982

.034
.082
.258
.217
.612

Note. AARP = American Association of Retired Persons; APS = adult protective services.
Cox and Snell R2 = .247.

ever, it was not significant, nor were two of the other variables in the
equation: median family income and the child abuse rate. All were positive as might be expected, with the child abuse rate probably mirroring
the amount of actual abuse. The only significant predictor, perhaps not
surprisingly, was the amount expended on APS per elderly population.
As the median income increases, so does the substantiation rate. Likewise, the rate of substantiation increases with the amount expended on
the effort of APS. When there is more child abuse in the state (holding
median family income constant), there are relatively more substantiations.

6. CONCLUDING REMARKS

We have reported regressions at length to show the importance of the
political climate behind making law on any level. Politics matters, regardless of whether the public actor is important and elected or outside
the public eye and underpaid. We have demonstrated that interest groups
and the personal interests of legislators did not affect the legislation in
the ways we might first have suspected. That is, because the people
making law (or lobbying for the elderly) are not themselves dependent,
they are apt to prefer programs that will benefit themselves in early
retirement. At bottom, we find no real pressure group for the aged and
dependent population that does not reside in nursing homes.
Nonetheless, the way laws are drawn and implemented does matter
to the people they are designed to serve. We suggest that states carefully
examine the laws they develop regarding elder abuse and particularly
give attention to definitions in the regulations. States with a more highly
educated population are apt to do this, but lobbying groups (whether
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Table 11. Determinates of Substantiation Rates: Rule Requiring Adult Protective Services to
Track All Reports, Endogenous

Variable
Keep Track
Median family income
Rate of expenditures on APS
Child abuse rate
Constant

B

Standard
Error

Significance

.551
4.200E-06
1.890E-08
.022
.280

1.885
.000
.000
.020
1.616

.774
.888
.017
.300
.864

2
Note. APS = adult protective services. R = .238.

the AARP or nursing home administrators) have no significant effect,
and a negative one at that. Whenever there is money to achieve this
result, we feel that it is critical to have different investigators who attend
to children and elders at risk for abuse.
Certain features of the law that governs APS affect elder abuse interventions. Specificity, requirements of APS specialization, and mandates that abuse be tracked from the reporting stage add accountability
and expertise to the system."' Here, at the regulatory level, the AARP
lobbyists do at least seem to be working in the same direction as the
affected population, sometimes significantly so.
While we already have data to analyze the effects of various socioeconomic variables on identified outcome measures, we also stress the
need to be more precise about what "report" means as well as take into
account the way individual APS offices implement the given state legal
mandates. While we realize that because of underreporting as well as
the differences in state definitions of abuse, we cannot claim to have
counted all abuse in the United States, we have established a baseline
so that future studies can measure the impact of change on abuse investigations and substantiations. Because our data are the first collected
on the local reporting level, we are closer than other studies in knowing
the "gold standard"-the actual amount of domestic elder abuse. Future
studies might collect similar data for institutional abuse and should reexamine the legal questions we have addressed from the perspective of
the APS workers.

51. Reasons why this might improve performance can be found in Rachlinski and
Farina (2002, pp. 588-92).
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